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We explore the role of fiscal policy over the business cycle from a normative perspective, for a government 
with a highly volatile and exogenous revenue source. Instead of resorting to Keynesian mechanisms, in our 
framework fiscal policy plays a role because the government provides transfers to heterogeneous households 
facing volatile income, albeit with an imperfect transfer technology (a fraction of transfers leak to richer 
households). We calibrate the model to Chile’s highly volatile government revenues derived from copper, and 
characterize the optimal fiscal reaction. We quantify the welfare gains vis-à-vis a balanced budget rule, and 
the degree of adequate fiscal countercyclicality. We also analyze simpler rules, such as the structural balance 
rule in place in Chile during the last decade, more general linear rules, and linear rules with an escape clause. 
We find that the optimal rule leads to the same welfare gain as doubling the government’s copper revenues 
under a balanced budget rule. Chile’s structural balance rule achieves 18% of these gains, while a linear rule 
with an escape clause achieves 83% of the gains. The degrees of countercyclicality of the optimal rule and the 




Se explora el papel de la política fiscal a través del ciclo económico desde una perspectiva normativa, bajo un 
gobierno con una fuente de ingresos altamente volátiles y exógenos. En lugar de recurrir a mecanismos 
keynesianos, en el marco de nuestro trabajo la política fiscal juega un papel, dado que el Gobierno 
proporciona transferencias a hogares heterogéneos con ingresos volátiles, aunque con una tecnología de 
transferencia imperfecta (una fracción de las transferencias se filtra hacia los hogares más ricos). El modelo se 
calibra con los altamente volátiles ingresos del Gobierno de Chile derivados del cobre, y caracterizamos la 
reacción fiscal óptima. Cuantificamos las ganancias de bienestar derivadas de la regla en relación con un 
presupuesto equilibrado, y el grado adecuado de anticiclicidad fiscal. También se analizan normas más 
sencillas, tales como la regla de balance estructural en Chile durante la última década, reglas lineales más 
generales, y reglas lineales con una cláusula de escape. Se encuentra que la regla óptima conduce a una 
mejora del bienestar equivalente a duplicar los ingresos del Gobierno derivados del cobre bajo una regla de 
equilibrio presupuestario. La regla de balance estructural en Chile alcanza un 18% de estas ganancias, 
mientras que una regla lineal con una cláusula de escape alcanza un 83% de las ganancias. Los grados de 
contraciclicidad de la regla óptima y la regla lineal con una cláusula de escape son similares entre sí y mucho 
mayores que los de la regla de balance estructural. 
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Well before the Great Recession of 2009 put ﬁscal policy debates in the front burner, commodity exporting
countries had to deal with important ﬁscal policy dilemmas stemming from revenue volatility and eventual
depletion. Chilean policymakers have been at the forefront in this area after adopting a ﬁscal rule to guide
government spending decisions a decade ago. This so called structural balance rule (SBR) incorporates ﬂuc-
tuations in copper prices —the main source of volatility in ﬁscal revenues— and was instrumental to save
large part of the windfall during the commodity boom of 2005-2008. Yet when the country went into reces-
sion in 2009, the rule was de facto abandoned as authorities implemented a ﬁscal expansion beyond that
suggested by the SBR.
While having a ﬁscal rule has served Chile well, there are pending questions about the appropriateness
of its design. How much would welfare improve if the rule were modiﬁed to respond more to accumulated
assets? Or if spending were more countercyclical? Furthermore, since the rule is well understood and has
gainedlegitimacyacrosssociety, itisdesirabletoconsiderimprovementsthatdonotentailmajordepartures
from its current structure. This raises the question of whether the gains from moving toward a spending
policy with a higher propensity to spend out of assets when private income is low can be achieved with a rule
similar to the SBR, for example, by adding an escape clause whereby spending is expanded beyond what is
prescribed for “normal” times in predetermined “extreme” circumstances.
In this paper we explore from a normative perspective the contours of an optimal spending rule for a
government that has volatile revenues from an exogenous source such as a ﬂow from a natural resource, very
much like Chile. Speciﬁcally, we analyze policies for a government with a precautionary saving motive that
decides how much to transfer from volatile copper revenues to impatient agents that differ in their private
incomes, which in turn are volatile and correlated with ﬁscal revenues. Much as in reality, the government
can save abroad, has limited space for borrowing against future revenue, and has access to an imperfect
technology for targeting transfers (a portion of transfers leaks to richer households). Households’ behavior is
simple: they consume all available income.
Outputisexogenousinourmodel,thatis,ﬁscalmultipliersarezero,soanycountercyclicalactionreﬂects
thedesireofincreasingtransfersattimeswhenhouseholdconsumptionislowandgovernmentspendinghas
a higher marginal utility, rather than a Keynesian mechanism. Fiscal policy is ultimately the implementation
of social insurance.
We analyze the welfare gains of an optimal rule vis-a-vis a balanced budget rule whereby the government
transfers all its revenues to households in each period. We also study the behavior of government assets and
the extent to which government spending is countercyclical. We compare the optimal rule prescribed by our
model with simpler rules, including the Chilean SBR, a rule that spends the permanent income from copper
(à-la Friedman), and linear rules similar to the SBR except that propensities to consume out of assets and
structural revenues are chosen optimally. We also analyze the gains from having an escape clause.
The last global cycle made apparent once again that government revenues in Chile are heavily inﬂuenced
by copper prices. From representing less than 1 percent of GDP (or about 5 percent of total government
revenues) in 1998-2003, government mining revenues increased to more than 8 percent of GDP following the
riseofcopperpricesin2004-2008(Figure1). Withthesubsequentdecreaseincommodityprices, copperrev-
enuesdeclinedto 3percentofGDP.Non-miningrevenues, whichareonaverage higher, havealsoﬂuctuated,
but their volatility has been considerably lower. Spending decisions, on the other hand, have been guided by
a predetermined central government structural result target (1 percent of GDP until 2006, 0.5 percent of GDP
in2007and0percentin2008). Tothisend, spendinghasbeenbasedonwhatisconsidered“permanent”rev-
enues, stripping out cyclical revenues which include both tax revenues —inﬂuenced by the GDP cycle— and
1the volatile mining revenues affected by the price of copper. In principle, the rule aims at an acyclical ﬁscal
behavior and the full operation of automatic stabilizers on the tax revenue side. Real government spending
growth would be relatively stable and change only with innovations in trend GDP growth, changes in tax pol-
icy and updates of what is considered the normal or reference copper price. The consequence has been that
the overall ﬁscal result has varied considerably in a few years, with large savings when copper prices were
high and large spending when the country went into recession (Figure 2). Government net assets increased
to more than 20 percent of GDP in 2008.
Fiscal policy was decisively countercyclical in 2009, when the economy entered into recession following
the Lehman collapse. Real government spending increased by 18 percent (year-on-year) providing a ﬁscal
impulse of 3 percent of GDP , one of the highest one year ﬁscal impulses in emerging market economies
during the Great Recession. Part of the ﬁscal reaction was in the form of targeted transfers to poor families.
Unemploymentincreasedto more than10 percentin2009, only slightly less thaninthepreviousrecessionof
1998-1999 that also followed large external shocks. Output contracted by 1.5 percent in 2009, more than the
0.8 percent drop in the previous recession. Interestingly, however, the government approval rating followed
very distinct patterns: it increased signiﬁcantly in 2009, largely due to perceptions of economic policies,
while it tanked in 1998-1999 (Figure 3). This suggests that targeted ﬁscal policies at times of hardship were
very welcome by many households.
In our model the gains from moving from a balanced budget rule to an optimal rule are sizeable, which
suggests that the proﬁle of ﬁscal spending can be quite relevant. With the baseline parameters calibrated to
the Chilean economy, welfare gains from an optimal rule are equivalent to a proportional increase of copper
revenues by 100% under a balanced budget rule. Optimal spending displays signiﬁcant countercyclicality: a
fall of one standard deviation in private income leads, on average, to a rise in government transfers of 50% of
the government’s median income. The optimal rule is more countercyclical when government expenditures
are less targeted, as the relative value of government transfers during recession increases in this case. Put
somewhat differently, the inefﬁciencies of poor targeting are less costly during recessions.
Simpler rules also provide signiﬁcant welfare gains. The SBR rule attains 18% of the gains obtained un-
der the optimal rule, a Friedman-type rule does somewhat better, achieving 20% of possible gains. Gains
increase substantially when considering linear rules where, by contrast with the Chilean SBR and Friedman-
type rules, the marginal propensities to spend out of assets and wealth are chosen optimally to reﬂect het-
erogeneous households, imperfect targeting and borrowing constraints. The results suggest a considerably
lower propensity to consume out of structural copper revenues and a higher one with respect to assets, in
comparison to the SBR. These parameters narrow the distribution of assets. The best linear rule attains 74%
of the gains obtained under the optimal rule. Furthermore, allowing for rules that switch between two linear
regimes depending on the GDP cycle further increases welfare to 83% of the gain under the optimal rule. As
expected, the propensity to spend out of assets and structural revenue is higher in the low GDP regime. In
fact, the main difference between rules with one and two linear regimes is that the former are pretty much
acyclical while the latter capture the degree of countercyclical expenditure present in the optimal rule. We
interpret the quasi-optimality of a regime switching rule as the gains from having escape clauses for extreme
events which simple rules are not able to cope with adequately.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 describes the
model. Section 4 implements the model with Chilean data. This section describes the optimal ﬁscal rule,
evaluates welfare gains, and analyzes its behavior under different environments and shocks. Section 5 inves-
tigates whether alternative simpler rules provide useful approximations to the optimal solution, with special
focus on Chile’s structural rule and variations that could help improve it. Finally, section 6 presents some
concluding remarks.
22 Relation to the literature
Thispaperisrelatedtotwoliteratures. First,itdrawsfromworksonoptimalconsumptionwithself-insurance.
The starting point is the “income ﬂuctuation problem”, where a risk averse consumer receives an exogenous,
stochastic income stream and maximizes her expected discounted utility, subject to an exogenous credit
constraint that assumes all debts are repaid.2 The agent has a precautionary saving motive and is impatient,
as in Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1990), and Carroll (1992, 1997).3 The model in this paper may be viewed as an
income ﬂuctuations problem where a planner with volatile income saves and spends to maximize the sum
of expected discounted utilities of heterogenous, impatient households with their own sources of volatile
incomes.
This paper also relates to the “cost of business cycles” debate triggered by Lucas (1987).4 We consider
a government with a highly volatile source of income and compare the welfare implications of spending
incomes upon receipt (‘balanced budget rule’) with those of using a ﬁscal rule. Our results show that a ﬁscal
rule aimed at stabilizing the incomes of the poor during downturns leads to considerably larger welfare gains
than those obtained by Lucas.
A second type of work connected to this paper is the study of ﬁscal policy rules. For the most part, the
applied literature has focused on issues of ﬁscal sustainability and whether having ﬁscal rules is, from a posi-
tiveperspective,usefultothatend. IMF(2009)andseveralofthechaptersofKopits(2004)aregoodexamples
of this type of analysis. The former documents that ﬁscal rules have become more common in recent years,
with almost 80 countries having rules in place in early 2009 (from less than 10 in 1990), and that, on average,
they have been associated with improved ﬁscal performance and more prudent ﬁscal policies. The latter
compiles several case studies to analyze conditions under which rules have succeeded and concludes that
political support and transparency are critical, while the extent to which a rule is legally enshrined is largely
irrelevant.
One particular strand of the ﬁscal policy rules literature has studied the challenges arising from revenues
tied to nonrenewable commodities with volatile prices (e.g., oil and copper). Villafuerte, López-Murphy and
Ossowski(2010)analyzetherecentexperiencewithﬁscalpolicyofcommodityrichLatinAmericancountries,
concluding that, on average, policies have been somewhat procyclical, that countries that pursued more
conservative ﬁscal policies during the boom were able to implement more aggressive countercyclical ﬁscal
policies during the downturn, and that these dimensions of ﬁscal policy were not linked to ﬁscal rules or
resource funds.
Therealsoexistscloselyrelatedworkonﬁscalrulesfromanormativeperspectivewithfocusoncommodity-
related revenues. A standard approach has been to apply Friedman’s permanent-income-hypothesis and
prescribe rules that spend the annuity value of the commodity-related wealth. Segura (2006) is one of sev-
eral papers based on this approach, which is attractive because of its simplicity but has several shortcomings
precisely for the same reason. Among the shortcomings is that it neglects both that households have other
sourcesofincomebeyondtransfers,andthatprecautionarysavingscanbeparticularlyimportantgivencom-
modity price volatility. Engel and Valdés (2000) analyze the intergenerational distribution of an exhaustible
commodity(oil, intheircase)whenhouseholdincomeisincreasingovertime, aswellasappropriateprecau-
tionary saving given volatile prices and imperfect insurance markets. Maliszewski (2009) applies the frame-
work to oil-producing countries concluding that ad-hoc rules perform relatively poorly. Drexler, Engel and
2See Schechtman (1976) for the seminal paper and Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) for a recent contribution with a good overview.
3As noted by Schechtman (1976), in this setting an agent with inﬁnite marginal utility at zero consumption optimally acts as if she
were liquidity constrained even if there are no such constraints.
4See Barlevy (2004), Lucas (2003) and Yellen and Akerlof (2004) for surveys of this literature with diverging conclusions on where it
stands. Also see Krusell et al. (2009) for a recent contribution.
3Valdés (2002) apply the framework to Chile and copper, noting that actual ﬁscal policy has been closer to
the prescriptions of a model with precautionary saving than to those of a model based solely on smooth-
ing government expenditures. The focus in their paper is the distribution of natural resource wealth across
generations, not across households over the cycle as in this paper.
Finally, there are papers that have studied the implications of different ﬁscal rules for macroeconomic
volatility, including the effects of the Chilean ﬁscal rule, through new-Keynesian DSGE models. In gen-
eral, these papers assume some form of non-Ricardian behavior (so that ﬁscal policy has non trivial effects)
through the existence of liquidity constrained consumers (in the form of rule-of-thumb or hand-to-mouth
decisions, very much like in our model). Andres and Domenech (2006) analyze whether there is a tradeoff
between sustainability of public ﬁnances and their countercyclicality power, concluding that this is not the
case. Kumhof and Laxton (2009) compare a balanced budget rule with rules that embed a more active coun-
tercyclicality, including one with a structural balance. They conclude that there are high potential welfare
gains from using more active rules and that, in the case of commodity-driven revenues, automatic stabilizers
should be allowed to operate fully (keeping spending stable). In the speciﬁc case of the Chilean ﬁscal rule,
both Kumhof and Laxton (2010) and Batini, Levine and Pearlman (2009) conclude that a balanced-budget
rule is inferior when compared to a structural budget rule. The ﬁrst paper also concludes that a rule with
more activism thanthe structural balance rule lowers outputvolatility witha minor cost ininﬂationvolatility
but considerable movements in the ﬁscal instrument. None of these papers deals with imperfect targeting of
ﬁscal policy or heterogeneous agents and the income distribution, as we do in this paper.
3M o d e l
We analyze the optimal program of a planner that can save and spend incomes from a natural resource to
maximize the sum of discounted utilities of agents representing the economy’s income quintiles. An impor-
tant departure from previous work is that the planner cannot target households at will but is constrained by
an exogenous “transfer technology”.
3.1 Households
Time is discrete. Total private income follows an exogenous stochastic process, Y
p
t . Income quintiles are
indexed, from the poorest to the richest, by i =1,2,...,5. Each quintile is represented by one household, all of
which have subjective discount rate δ>0. The income share of quintile i, which remains constant over time,
is denoted by si,w i t h0≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤···≤s5 and
 5
i=1si =1. Households consume all their income.5
3.2 Planner
The planner receives an exogenous, stochastic income stream Y
g
t derived from a natural resource (we could
extend the model to incorporate tax revenues). The planner can save at an exogenous riskless real rate r with
r <δ so that households (and therefore the planner representing them) are impatient.
The planner faces an exogenous debt limit B that allows her to pay back her debt with probability one,6





5This admittedly strong assumption avoids modeling the strategic interaction between the planner and households, and provides a
role for ﬁscal rules. In Engel, Neilson and Valdés (2011) we relax this assumption.
6That is, B is less than or equal to the planner’s “natural debt limit”, deﬁned at the minimum present value of income.
4and the borrowing constraint takes the form
At+1 ≥−B.
The planner’s expenditures are distributed across quintiles according to an exogenous, time-invariant,



























At +B ≥0, t =1,2,3,...
Gt ≥0, t =0,1,2,...




















In periods where the solution is interior, a straightforward calculation starting from the sequential for-














The planner spends resources to equalize a weighted sum of current marginal utilities with the correspond-
ing discounted expected weighted sum of next period’s marginal utilities. The weights given by the targeting
function: quintilesthatbeneﬁtmorefromgovernmentexpendituresreceiveahigherweight. TheEulerequa-
tion also shows that an increase in expected future private incomes leads to higher current spending by the
planner.
















considering ﬁrst the case with perfect targeting, which requires allowing the αi to vary over time and will
serve as a useful benchmark.
When the planner can target expenditures at will, there exists a simple characterization of the distribu-
5tion of government expenditures across households, conditional on the choice of Gt.7 Expenditures are dis-
tributed across quintiles so as to equalize marginal utilities among the poorer quintiles untilGt is exhausted.
Richer quintiles do not receive any transfers while remaining households achieve a common consumption
level, so that poorer quintiles receive higher transfers.
More precisely, denoting by   Gk total transfers needed to equalize total incomes of quintiles 1 through k
with private income of quintile k +1, a straightforward calculation shows that





t , k =1,2,...,4,
where we adopt the convention that s0 =0,   G0 =0 and   G5 =∞.
Since the sequence   Gk is increasing, given a level G ≥ 0 of government expenditure there exists a unique
non-negative integer k such that   Gk ≤ G <   Gk+1. The optimal allocation of Gt across quintiles transfers
resources only to quintiles 1 through k +1, and does so in a way that equalizes their total incomes. Denoting












Gt −   Gk
k +1
),
with k given by the piecewise constant, increasing function ofGt described above.
4 Implementation and Results
In this section we implement the model described in Section 3 with data from Chile. The trusting (or impa-
tient) reader can skip section 4.1 that describes our parameter and functional choices and move directly to
section 4.2 that describes the optimal policy.
4.1 Parameter choices
To determine the joint process of private and government revenues, we considered annual data for the 1990-
2009 period. We proxied Y p by the difference between GDP and government expenditures per capita (data
source: Central Bank of Chile), and detrended logY p using a quadratic trend. The resulting stationary vari-
able is denoted by yp in what follows. We work with detrended Y p to highlight the relation between cyclical
ﬂuctuations and optimal ﬁscal policy.
WeproxiedY g bypercapitaﬁscalrevenuesderivedfromcopper,bothdirectlyfromstateownedCODELCO,
and indirectly via taxes on privately held copper companies (source Dirección de Presupuesto). We denote
logY g by yg.
We ﬁtted a ﬁrst-order VAR to (yp,yg) and, under the identifying assumption that current innovations
to yp have no effect on current yg, found no statistically signiﬁcant effect of past innovations of yp on yg
(see Figure 4 for the resulting impulse-response functions). We therefore chose as our benchmark income
7Engel and Valdés (2000) derive a similar result in a model that distributes natural resource wealth across generations.





















where only contemporaneous innovations are allowed to be correlated. In Section 4.3 we consider two al-
ternative speciﬁcations, one where past values of yg have no effect on current yp (Fpg = 0), the other where
past values of yp inﬂuence yg.8
Since we are interested in ﬁscal rules that are relevant in coming years, we set the average value of Yg at
2.1% of the average value of Yp —which is somewhat lower than the 3% observed in the data— to account for
the fact that Y p was much higher toward the end of the period than at the beginning.
The planner’s problem is solved using a Tauchen discretization for the joint distribution of (yp,yg). This
discretization has 25 states: yp takes ﬁve values and associated with every value of yp there are ﬁve possible
values of yg. Table 1 shows the probabilities of the 5 values of yp and the magnitudes of the corresponding
deviations from trend.
We set the annual risk free interest rate, r, at 5% and the subjective discount factor, δ, at 8%. A useful
way to capture the notion that poor households value relatively more having smoother consumption across
periodsand states ofnaturethanwealthierhouseholds istoconsider aninstantaneous utility functionu that






1−θ(c −c∗)1−θ, θ  =1,
log(c −c∗), θ =1.
(2)
Where c∗ denotes the subsistence level. We consider a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, θ, of 3 in the
benchmark model and set c∗ at 98% of the income of the poorest quintile in the worst aggregate income
scenario, which corresponds to an annual per capita income of approximately 800 US dollars (the poverty
line has varied around 1,200 US dollars during the period considered).
To solve the model we impose an upper bound on accumulated assets equal to average private income;
this restriction is rarely binding and results do not change making it looser. We also impose a lower bound of
zero on assets (B =0).
Table2showsthevaluesfortheincomeshareandexpenditureshareparameters, si andαi,foreachquin-
tile. They correspond to values reported by MIDEPLAN in 2009 which are calculated using the CASEN 2009
household survey. Social expenditure targeting inChile is considerably better than in most developingcoun-
tries, Figure 1 in Rey de Marulanda, Ugaz and Guzman (2006) suggests that the “typical” targeting function
in Latin America is close to ‘uniform targeting’, that is, to having αi =1/5 for all quintiles.
8The latter could reﬂect, for example, that a negative shock to private income leads to a depreciation of the peso, thereby increasing
revenues from copper measured in pesos. Alternatively, a negative GDP shock might lead the government to ask CODELCO to lower
its investment and increase transfers to the government. Even though, as mentioned above, our VAR analysis found no statistically
signiﬁcant effect of past GDP shocks on current copper revenues, the estimated coefﬁcients are economically signiﬁcant which, given
the relatively short series at hand, suggests this case may be relevant as well.
9See, for example, Deaton and John Muellbauer 1980, chapter 3. An alternative route is to allow for a marginal utility of consumption
that is decreasing in wealth, as in Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1991), Attanasio and Browining (1995), Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), and
Guvenen (2006). We are exploring this route in ongoing work.
74.2 Optimal policy
The left panel in Figure 4 shows optimal government expenditure as a function of government assets, for
three values of private income. Government income is held (approximately) constant at its median value.10
The dash-dotted (lower) curve assumes high private income (highest value in the discretization), the solid
(intermediate) curve intermediate private income (median value) and the dashed (higher) curve low private
income(lowestvalueinthediscretization). BothG and A arenormalizedbyaverageprivateincome(referred
to as average GDP in what follows). The right panel is similar except that now Y g is held (approximately)
constant at its lowest value.
Otherthingsequal,expendituresarehigherwhenprivatesectoroutputislower,thatis,whenthemarginal
utility of private consumption is higher. The government saves during good times to be able to spend in bad
times. Theexpenditurefunctionsareconcave(intheregionswithpositiveexpenditure), implyingamarginal
propensity to spend out of assets that decreases with assets. Concavity of the expenditure function for low
asset values is more pronounced during recessions (low values of Y p), reﬂecting the interplay between the
precautionary motive and impatience.
Comparing both panels in Figure 4 shows that government expenditures are lower when current ﬁscal
income is lower. In fact, when ﬁscal revenues are low and private income is sufﬁciently high, there exists a
range of asset values where the government ﬁnds it optimal not to spend at all.
4.2.1 Asset Accumulation
Mean and median assets in steady state are equal to 38.9 and 32.9% of average GDP, even though assets
accumulate slowly. Starting from zero, mean and median assets during the ﬁrst 25 years of the rule are 13.2
and 6.1% of GDP, respectively; Figure 6 depicts the corresponding histogram (based on 4,000 simulations
with 25 periods each, that is, 100,000 observations).
4.2.2 Welfare gain
To gauge the welfare gains under the optimal rule, we quantify the associated welfare improvement with that
obtained under a balanced budget rule where the government does not incur in debt or save from current



























Thus γ measures the fraction by which ﬁscal revenue must increase when the government spends all its
income upon receipt, to achieve the same level of expected welfare than under the optimal rule.11 We obtain
a value for γ of 1.001 starting from A0 =0. The welfare gain under the optimal ﬁscal rule is considerable.
An alternative welfare measure compares gains under the optimal rule with a scenario with no natural

























The normalization constant Q is such that γ∗ = 1 when si = αi for all i and the natural resource income





10As described above, the discretization we consider leads to small differences in yg across the three states considered.
11When A0 >0 we assume that in the balanced budget counterfactual the government spends the annuity value from A0.
8with no assets, the value of γ∗ is equal to 3.122 for the optimal program. Thus, even though copper revenue
equals, on average, only 2.1% of GDP , the welfare improvement it leads to under the optimal ﬁscal rule is akin
to increasing private income by 6.6%. This happens because targeting is considerably better than having
transfers proportional to quintile income, and because the natural resource revenue is far from perfectly
correlated with private income (correlation of 0.45). It is also possible to calculate γ∗ for the balance budget







The solution is denoted by γ∗
BB and equal to 1.65 in our basline, implying that welfare under a balanced
budget rule is the same than under a 3.5% increase in private incomes and no natural resource revenue
(3.5∼ =1.65×2.1%).
4.2.3 Cyclical behavior
The macroeconomic implications of the optimal ﬁscal rule for the cyclical behavior of government expen-
diture can be captured in various ways. Obvious options are the correlation between the economic cycle,
as measured by (detrended) Y
p
t , and government expenditures or savings. We would expect the latter to be
procyclical and the former to be countercyclical.
Denoting government saving by St, we have St =Y
g
t −Gt and a straightforward calculation shows that
σ(St)ρ(St,Y
p









where ρ(xt,yt) denotes the (time-series) correlation between xt and yt while σ(xt) denotes the standard de-
viation of xt. Equation (4) shows that procyclical government saving is equivalent to countercyclical govern-
ment spending only when private and government income are uncorrelated. When both sources of income
are positively correlated, as is the case in most countries with signiﬁcant revenues from natural resources,
including Chile, the possibility of procyclical saving and expenditure arises. This is the case for the optimal
policy in our benchmark model: the correlation between government saving and the economic cycle is 0.30
while the correlation between government spending and the cycle is 0.26. By comparison, these correlations
are zero and 0.45 for a balanced budget rule, respectively.
An alternative way to quantify the extent to which optimal spending varies with the business cycle, Y p,i s











where med(xt) denotes the median of xt. CCG captures the response of government expenditures, as a frac-
tionofmediangovernmentincome,associatedwithadecreaseofonestandarddeviationsinprivateincome.
For the benchmark model we obtain CCG = 0.49, which implies that government expenditure, as a fraction
of median government income, increases by 49%, on average, when private income drops by a standard de-
viation.
94.3 Alternative Parametrizations
Column 1 in Table 3 shows the main statistics for the benchmark model: welfare gains, both compared with
a balanced budget rule and with the scenario with no natural resource income (γ and γ∗); measures of asset
accumulation under the optimal rule (median accumulation during the ﬁrst 25 years and in steady state),
two indices for countercyclical behavior (correlation between savings and the cycle, and the CCG measure
deﬁned in (5)), and welfare gains under a balanced budget rule, γ∗
BB. The ﬁrst three and the last statistic
assume initial assets equal to zero, the 4th, 5th and 6th rows report steady-state values.
Columns 2 through 8 show summary statistics for the optimal rule if we modify parameters from the
benchmark model that characterize household preferences, one at a time. The cost of moving to the optimal
rule starting with a low level of assets is front loaded, since the planner must accumulate assets to spend in
times where the marginal utility of consumption is high. By contrast and for the same reason, the beneﬁts
from adopting a ﬁscal rule are back loaded. This explains why an increase in the households’s subjective
discount factor lowers welfare gains and asset accumulation (column 2) while a decrease has the opposite
effect (column 3).








which is decreasing in θ and c∗. This explains why columns 4 through 8 show that the beneﬁts from a ﬁscal
rule are larger when households have a stronger preference for a smoother consumption over time (smaller
EIS). Also, ﬁscal policy is more countercyclical when households, particularly those in the poorest quintile,
are less able to smooth consumption over time. Even though smaller in some cases than for the benchmark
model, the countercyclical measures of ﬁscal policy are signiﬁcant in all cases.
Table 4 considers changes in the income processes. Columns 2 and 3 ﬁt separate AR(1) processes to yp
and yg and assume independent innovations (column 2) and correlated innovations (column 3, the correla-
tion is 0.40). The value of owning copper, compared to a scenario with no natural resource revenues, is larger
when innovations are independent than when they are positively correlated, both under the optimal policy
and under a balanced budget policy (γ∗
BB of 3.81 vs. 2.45, γ∗ of 5.24 vs. 4.12). The reason for this is that a rev-
enue stream that is uncorrelated with private income provides more insurance than a positively correlated
income source.
Column 4 of Table 4 considers a ﬁrst order VAR where, by contrast with the benchmark income process,
past private income shocks are allowed to affect current commodity revenues (see footnote 8). Following a
negativeinnovationtoprivateincome, wenowhavethatrevenuesfromthenaturalresourcecanbeexpected
to rise in the next period, which allows the planner to spend more aggressively today, since there is less need
to save resources for future periods. This explains why the value of the optimal policy, both as measured by
γ and γ∗, is higher than in the benchmark case and the cases with standard AR speciﬁcations.
Columns 5 through 8 show that the beneﬁts of a ﬁscal rule increase with the volatility of income, both
ﬁscal and private, when compared with a balanced budget rule, leading to higher values of γ. In the case
of a change in the volatility of ﬁscal revenues, this improvement largely reﬂects that the value of a balanced
budget rule deteriorates signiﬁcantly when volatility increases (see the γ∗ reported in the last row of the
table): an increase in the volatility of copper revenues, which is positively correlated with private income,
decreases the extent to which this income stream provides insurance.
Columns 9 and 10 consider changes in the importance of copper revenues: a 50% decrease and increase,
respectively. The value of the optimal program, compared with the balanced budget rule, is larger when
10copper revenue is less important. The marginal beneﬁt of additional natural resource income is smaller
when overall resources are larger, as these resources are likely to be spent at times when marginal utility of
additional government expenditures is lower.
Finally, Table 5 summarizes the effects of changes in the targeting technology. Welfare gains increase
when Chile’s targeting parameters are replaced by less focalized uniform targeting (αi = 1/5 for all i) while
countercyclicality increases considerably. The relative social value of targeting during recessions is much
higher when targeting is poor. Welfare gains also increases considerably under perfect targeting (γ∗ in the
second row provides the correct measure in this case).
Table 6 provides an alternative comparison of the three targeting technologies. It reports average expen-
ditures for the ﬁve private income scenarios (see Table 1). The ﬁrst column considers a balanced budget
policy, where no effort is made to use copper income to smooth household consumption or provide precau-
tionary saving, the remaining columns consider the same targeting technologies as in Table 5. The last row
of this table shows that, as expected, total expenditures are higher when the government accumulates as-
sets. Given the extremely high volatility of copper revenues and its positive correlation with private incomes,
this results in highly procyclical government transfers, explaining the dramatic difference between columns
2–4 and column 1. Government expenditures when private income is low increase considerably (by a factor
between 6 and 20, depending on the policy and low income state considered) when the government moves
beyond a balanced budget policy.
Expendituresaremorecountercyclicalwhentargetingislessfocussed,forexample,governmenttransfers
are at least 10% higher under Chile’s relatively good targeting than under uniform targeting. Nonetheless,
expenditures are highest, on average, when private income is highest. The reason is that copper revenues are
procyclical and highly persistent, so that the wealth effect associated with high copper revenues dominates
over the precautionary motive.
5 Simple Rules
There are many reasons why ﬁscal rules used in practice should be simple. First, to help communicate the
constraints imposed by the rule on public spending to elected ofﬁcials and the public in general. This helps
legitimize the rule and makes less likely that it is abandoned. Second, because often ﬁscal rules are written
into laws and this is not easy with rules that require tabulations of the values used to plot ﬁgures like those
in Figures 6 to characterize how much is spent and how much is saved in a given year. That is, to be useful,
rules need to be easily replicable in terms of their calculation. Third, because sometimes, as in the Chilean
case, the starting point is a simple rule that has earned legitimacy among policymakers and the public, so
that moving to a much more complex rule may come at the cost of losing this social capital.
5.1 Rules considered
Our starting point is a version of the Chilean Structural Balance Rule (SBR) and the question we address is
how much closer we can get to the optimal rule discussed in Section 4.2 with a simple variant of the SBR.
















where Et denotes expectations based on information available in period t, which in our case is current and
pastvaluesofbothincomeprocesses. TheSBRprescribesspendingthesumofthecurrentstructuralincome,
equal to the best estimate for average income over the next decade, and the (long term) interest obtained on
assets saved.
The SBR is similar to the optimal spending/saving rule implied by Friedman’s permanent income theory















We consider the following simple variant of the SBR, which keeps the basic linear structure but free up





As mentioned in the introduction, real government spending increased by 18 percent (year-on-year) in
2009, going beyond the increase suggested by the SBR and providing a ﬁscal impulse of 3 percent of GDP.
SomeanalystsarguedatthetimethatthisincreasecouldbejustiﬁedbythefactthattheSBRdidnotallowfor
a marginal propensity to spend out of assets that increased during recessions.13 This motivates considering






t +θalAt,i f Y p low,
θshS G
t +θahAt,i f Y p normal or high.
(9)
The marginal propensities are allowed to vary with the economic cycle, as captured by private income Y p.
Weconsiderthecasewherethesecoefﬁcientscantaketwo(optimallychosen)values, dependingonwhether
private income is low (lowest two values in Table 1) or normal/high (highest three values in Table 1).
Rule (9) is a regime switching rule with two simple linear regimes, that can be thought of as a rule with an
escape clause. A simple linear rule operates most of the time (75% in our case), and this rule is abandoned in
“extreme” circumstances, when private income (in deviation from trend) is below a certain threshold.
In the case of all the simple rules we study in this section, we impose the same borrowing constraints
considered when deriving the optimal rule in Section 3, that is, At ≥0 andGt ≥0.14
Toestimatetheparametersinmodels(8)and(9)weproceedasfollows: Wegenerate1,000time-seriesfor
12We focus on copper-related revenue and continue ignoring tax revenue. In practice, every year the Finance Minister appoints a
committee of experts that provides an estimate for S G
t . See Frankel (2011) for a discussion of the institutional design of the rule.
13See, for example, the interview to one of this paper’s authors in La Segunda on July 24, 2009.
14Thus, for example, the rule in (8) actually hasGt =max(0,c0 +θsS G
t +θaAt).




k,t, k =1,...,1,000; t =1,...,100. Next
we use the Nelder-Mead Simplex Method to ﬁnd the parameter conﬁguration, θ within the family of rules


































k,t;θ) optimal expenditure, both for the k-th time-
series, under rule θ ∈Θ, at time t. This determines the optimal rule,   θ. To avoid overﬁtting, the value of γ we
report for   θ ∈ Θ is obtained by rerunning the above procedure with 4,000 series of newly generated income
series of length 100 each.
5.2 Results
Table 7 presents the summary statistics for the simple rules considered in this section. The SBR and the
Friedman-typeruleattain18and20%ofthewelfaregainobtainedundertheoptimalrule,respectively. These
rules tend to underaccumulate assets when compared with the optimal rule and, not surprisingly, both of
them vary very little, if at all, with the economic cycle.15
AnSBR-typerulewhere themarginalpropensitiestospend outofcurrentgovernmentincome andassets
are chosen optimally, leads to higher welfare, approximately 74% of the gain under the optimal rule. Table 8
reports the estimated marginal propensities to consume out of assets in this case, showing that the improve-
ment in performance is achieved by more than doubling the propensity to spend out of assets and reducing
by more than two thirds the propensity to spend out of structural income. This suggests that the SBR is too
responsive to changes in structural income and responds too little to changes in assets. This insight is robust
across speciﬁcations: the median value for the marginal propensity to spend out of assets across the 19 mod-
els considered in Tables 3–5 is 0.117 with an interquartile range of 0.025, . Similarly, the median value for the
propensity tospendoutofstructuralrevenueis0.335withaninterquartilerangeof0.293(therangeofvalues
goes from 0.116 to 0.747).
The regime switching rule achieves a signiﬁcant welfare gains, attaining 83% of the gains obtained under
the optimal rule (γ of 0.830 vs. 1.001). Both rules accumulate considerably fewer assets than the optimal rule
and, more important, the rule with an exit clause achieves a degree of countercyclicality similar to that of the
optimal rule while the optimal linear rule does not.
Table 8 also shows that the propensities to spend out of the government’s assets under the rule with
an exit clause is considerably larger during recessions than under the linear rule where these propensities
are chosen optimally but not allowed to vary over the cycle. By contrast, the propensities to spend during
expansions are similar under both rules where this propensity is chosen optimally. As far as the propensity
to spend out of structural income is concerned, rule (9) has a propensity that is higher than that of rule (8)
during recessions, but lower during normal times or expansions. A linear rule has a hard time capturing the
countercyclical behavior of the optimal rule, while a rule with an exit clause can capture this feature with a
marginal propensity that is higher when income is low.
The above insight can be applied to gauge how much government expenditures should have increased
when the economy went into recession in 2009. Compared with a linear rule, the rule with an escape clause
suggests an increase of almost one percentage point of GDP when accumulated assets are 20% of GDP, the
net assets the central government in Chile had going into 2009. Similarly, assuming structural government
15In fact, the SBR is somewhat procyclical, reﬂecting that structural revenue is procyclical and that the linear term in assets is not
important enough to undo this effect.
13revenue was at its average value of 2.1%, moving to the linear rule with an escape clause leads to additional
expenditures of approximately 0.4% of GDP. The combined effect is an increase of 1.4% of GDP beyond that
suggested by the rule in normal times, a meaningful ﬁscal expansion.
Summing up, a simple linear rule with an exit clause (that leads to a different, equally simple, linear rule)
does a remarkably good job at capturing the non-linearities present in the optimal policy. Furthermore, this
rule leads to lower asset accumulation and can be explained as a straightforward generalization of the SBR,
both factors that should enhance its political viability.
6 Conclusion
We have explored the qualitative and quantitative implications of different ways to conduct ﬁscal policy, that
is, the decision of how much to spend out of government income, in a framework where ﬁscal expenditure
has non trivial effects because households are hand-to-mouth consumers and both household and govern-
ment incomes face unpredictable shocks. Government income is particularly volatile, as it depends on the
price of a primary commodity.
The basic intuition guiding government expenditures is straightforward: help the private sector smooth
consumption by combining a precautionary motive with a smoothing-of-transitory-income-shocks (à-la-
Friedman) motive, with the following twist: the government does not only consider its own revenue and
assets when deciding how much to spend, but also looks at how the private sector is doing, spending more
when the private sector’s income is low. Furthermore, because there is income heterogeneity across house-
holds, and the government has only a limited ability to transfer income to the poor, the government faces a
non trivial tradeoff when implementing its spending rule: imperfect targeting increases the level of expen-
diture needed to achieve a given level of consumption for the poorest households, which in turn makes the
optimal policy more countercyclical than if targeting were perfect. It follows that better targeting leads to
less countercyclical government spending, implying that countries that have less capacity to target transfers
should run a more countercyclical effort.
The application of our model to Chile using plausible parameters describing income ﬂuctuations and
correlations, the household income distribution and the targeting technology, allows us to quantify the wel-
fare beneﬁts of different alternatives for conducting ﬁscal policy, from a (complex) optimal policy function
to simple linear rules, including the Chilean SBR. In comparison to a balanced budget rule, the optimal rule
improves welfare by the equivalent of a 100% increase of government copper revenue per year under our
baseline calibration, which includes positive effects from copper prices to private sector income. The opti-
mal policy involves signiﬁcant expected asset accumulation as a buffer stock, equivalent to around 33% of
GDP in our baseline, although it takes many years to reach large values. More important, the optimal pol-
icy implies a considerable degree of countercyclicality: a fall in private income of one standard deviation
translates into an average 50% rise in government transfers relative to median government income. In cer-
tain states (high private income, low copper revenues and low assets) the optimal policy is to save all current
income and cut transfers to zero.
The SBR used in Chile during the past decade and a Friedman-type rule attain meaningful welfare gains
of around 20 percent of those achieved by the optimal rule. On average, both simple rules accumulate less
assets than the optimal policy and are close to acyclical. Optimizing the marginal propensities to spend
out of assets and structural government income for an SBR-type rule, results in a propensity to spend out
structural/permanent copper revenues much lower than one, and a propensity to spend out of assets much
higherthantheannuityvalue. Thisruleyieldsconsiderableadditionalgains,attainingasurprising74percent
ofgainsobtainedundertheoptimum. TheresultthattheChileanruletendstospendtoomuchoutofcopper
14and too little out of assets is robust across parameter speciﬁcations.
Finally, motivated by the quantitative importance of the optimal rule’s countercyclical behavior, we also
exploredthe gains from aregimeswitchingrule with two linearrules, whichallows for higher spendingwhen
household income is particularly low (private sector in recession). This higher spending in certain states
of nature obviously needs higher savings in normal times. The welfare gain in this case is a surprising 83
percent of the optimum. The policy implication is that there would be substantial beneﬁts from adding an
escape clause to the Chilean SBR for recessions, when countercyclical spending is valued most, increasing
the propensities to spend out of assets and structural income, even though the latter remains below one. The
fact that the SBR was effectively abandoned during the 2009 possibly is not coincidental, as it allowed the
rule to provide social insurance.
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17Table 1: Private income states in the discretization of the state space






Table 2: Income and expenditure shares. Chile 1990-2009.







Source: MIDEPLAN and CASEN 2009
Table 3: Alternative preferences
12 3 4 5 6 78
——————————————————————————————————
Benchm. δ=0.1 δ=0.06 θ =5 θ =1 c∗ =0 c∗: 50% c∗: 90%
γ 1.001 0.806 1.307 1.526 0.131 0.176 0.275 0.557
γ∗ 3.244 2.920 3.747 1.199 4.222 6.705 6.793 5.093
Med(A25) 0.061 0.054 0.070 0.024 0.015 0.006 0.016 0.044
Med(Ass) 0.329 0.225 0.512 0.055 0.047 0.039 0.105 0.264
ρ(S,Y p) 0.299 0.288 0.299 0.196 0.232 0.236 0.266 0.295
CCG 0.491 0.412 0.557 0.809 0.117 0.097 0.262 0.451
γ∗
BB 1.647 1.635 1.662 0.594 3.836 5.919 5.672 3.642
18Table 4: Alternative income processes
1 2 3 4 567891 0
—————————————————————————————————————————
Benchm. Indep Correl. Unrestr. σ(yp) σ(yg) μ(Y g)
AR AR VAR ↓25% ↑25% ↓25% ↑25% ↓50% ↑50%
γ 1.001 0.546 0.897 1.170 0.882 1.093 0.458 1.837 1.153 0.906
γ∗ 3.244 5.245 4.211 4.409 3.152 3.379 5.416 1.792 3.542 3.039
Med(A25) 0.061 0.040 0.051 0.053 0.060 0.061 0.054 0.060 0.038 0.086
Med(Ass) 0.329 0.263 0.293 0.270 0.336 0.326 0.253 0.369 0.174 0.446
ρ(S,Y p) 0.299 0.070 0.271 0.296 0.283 0.314 0.338 0.260 0.332 0.283
CCG 0.491 0.304 0.390 0.613 0.437 0.521 0.216 1.133 0.481 0.476
γ∗
BB 1.647 3.813 2.451 2.245 1.728 1.617 3.735 0.695 1.671 1.635
Table 5: Alternative targeting technologies
12 3
————————————————–
Benchmark Unif. targ. Perf. targ.
γ 1.001 1.297 2.941
γ∗ 3.244 1.713 6.155
Med(A25) 0.061 0.077 0.060
Med(Ass) 0.329 0.209 0.329
ρ(S,Y p) 0.299 0.367 0.293
CCG 0.491 0.865 0.455
γ∗
BB 1.647 0.759 3.634
Table 6: AverageG conditional on yp (in %) for alternative targeting technologies
123 4
Targeting
BB Uniform Chile Perfect
Private inc.
Low 0.19 3.64 3.05 2.98
Below avge. 0.55 3.55 3.19 3.16
Avge. 1.54 3.65 3.59 3.58
Above avge. 4.19 4.49 4.74 4.77
High 11.30 8.97 9.36 9.38
Overall avge.G (%) 2.10 3.93 3.87 3.87
Table 7: Simple Rules
Rule Welfare gain γ Steady state CCG
(A0 =0) median assets
Benchmark: 1.001 0.329 0.491
Chile’s SBR: 0.180 0.095 −0.159
Friedman: 0.205 0.161 −0.001
Linear rule (8): 0.743 0.160 0.092
Rule with exit clause (9): 0.830 0.154 0.454
19Table 8: Simple Rules and Marginal Propensities to Spend
Rule A S G Const.
Chile’s SBR: 0.048 1.000 —
Linear rule (8): 0.118 0.290 −0.0006
Rule with exit clause (9):
Y p low: 0.164 0.467
−0.0023
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Figure 1: Copper and Fiscal Revenue Volatility
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Figure 3: Chile: Two recessions, two very different political approval dynamics



































Response of Yp to a Yp shock
Figure 4: Impulse-Responses of government copper revenues and private income


















































































Figure 5: Optimal Fiscal Spending. Y g at median value (left panel) and low value (right panel).





Figure 6: Distribution of Assets under Optimal Rule – First 25 Years.
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